Peace in Syria may hinge on Putin bringing Assad and rebels together against ISIS

An article on Russia Today - essentially Putin's main English mouthpiece - titled "Putin: No need to distinguish between ‘moderate’ & other terrorists" has the Russian leader asking Assad during the latter's recent trip to Moscow, rather ironically, about forming a united front with the opposition against ISIS:

Syrian President Bashar Assad has also agreed with the possibility of Russia offering support to the Syrian opposition in their fight against ISIS, Putin said. "I've asked [Assad]: What would you say if we support the opposition's efforts in their fight against terrorists the way we support the Syrian Army? And he said: My attitude is positive," the Russian leader told the Valdai forum.

So behind all the tough talk, in fact Putin's conflation of "terrorist" with "opposition" (to Assad) is more fluid than first meets the eye. Not only has he cultivated ties with secular, nonviolent dissenters that want Assad out of power about becoming part of a new unity government, but earlier this year Russia negotiated with some of the very same "terrorists" they've been bombing lately about fighting ISIS together. Presumably, the door is still open to them if they change their minds or, more likely, find Russian bombs too annoying to continue putting up with.

Newsweek appears to confirm Assad's apparent moderation of stance towards some rebel groups provided they decide to treat ISIS as a common enemy.

The New York Times, reporting on Mr. Assad's recent trip to Moscow, notes that Putin has already expended considerable effort getting his Syrian client to be more conciliatory towards the opposition; and unsurprisingly, Assad has probably stretched his patron's patience thin.

But if Putin now succeeds in finally getting Assad and some rebels to the table, the brilliance of his air campaign will be evident: the sheer dependence of Syrian government forces on Russian jets and pilots means that he's effectively taken Assad's grip on power out of Assad's hands and squarely into his own.

In other words, so long as Assad was fearful of complete collapse because he didn't have Russian air power, he could use Moscow's fear of losing Syria to tweak Putin's beak; but now that his regime is utterly dependent on Putin's air force to lock in its refortified strength, he has every reason to ingratiate himself with the Kremlin, even if that means talking to some "terrorists".