This blog's observation eleven days ago that the Syrian conflict is becoming a clear binary choice between Assad's brutal secular regime and Sunni extremists in the central battleground of Aleppo is being verified by diplomatic, political, and military developments on the ground which are emerging into the open.
Even Western media now admits the obvious: the battle of Aleppo has essentially become a sectarian showdown between Sunni and Shia jihadists from all across the region. That's really, really bad news for US policy: not only does it mean we no longer have a viable dog in this fight, but if anything, we're now coming under increasing pressure to join the Russian and Syrian regime air campaign against the Salafists led by the former Al Nusra Front (i.e. Al Qaeda in Syria), whose embrace of suicide attacks and fanaticism more generally has given them a glaring edge in battlefield effectiveness against Damascus relative to the remaining secular opposition fighters (i.e. Free Syrian Army or FSA).
Thus Putin, Assad, Iran and its proxies - the Axis of Fatima - now have exactly the war they want. Al Qaeda's dominant presence on the front lines of Aleppo puts their real opponents - Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and ultimately the US - in a political logjam: if they're serious about fighting extremism and terrorism, it's hard to put on a good face about deliberately avoiding targeting forces that are openly fighting for Shia, Alawite, and Christian genocide.
For starters, Washington is now out of the equation as a serious military-strategic player concerning Aleppo: after all, we're as existentially opposed to the proto-Talibanization of Syria as we are to the continued rule of Assad. The futility of our policy of regime change is now obvious for the entire world to see: those very factions most credible as alternatives to Assad aren't merely getting our cold shoulder, but must even be considered for our own bombs.
That leaves Turkey as the crucial swing factor: the way it recalibrates its relationship with the Syrian opposition - with all its moderate and extreme elements - will largely determine both the military and eventual political outcome of the battle for Aleppo. And of course, this will entirely be a function of Ankara's realigned internal politics in the wake of the July 15 putsch: how Mr. Erdogan rejuggles the balance of secularists and Islamists within his own government and military will have major bearing on the ultimate denouement of the armed stalemate across the border.
Already Turkey has made tentative (and still conflicting) gestures of dropping its implacable opposition to Assad's political survival; doubtless this is reflective of a highly fluid situation that's complicated greatly by the country's uncertain future both as a NATO member and as an aspiring EU one. As a prudent politician, Erdogan simply can't sacrifice wholesale secular interests for Islamist ones or vice versa - either at home or across the Syrian frontier; his even more pressing concern in any case would appear to be the Kurds.
That means Turkey will most likely use its influence to rein in the jihadist coalition at Aleppo from seeking a complete victory (one that's unlikely anyway) and instead direct them to collaborate with the remaining secular revolutionary opposition within the besieged rebel-held part of the city to relaunch the political transition process: at this juncture, probably the best Ankara could hope for is a freeze to the whole war that leaves Islamists with de facto control of virtually all of Idlib province, parts of the Aleppo countryside, and a limited enclave in Aleppo itself. Such a truce would also leave the original Syrian revolution intact politically to negotiate with Assad on behalf of the secular, moderate Islamist, and extreme Islamist opposition alike.That's where Turkish efforts and influence will face its test: the jihadists and probably even secular revolutionaries aren't likely to be swayed that military victory should be abandoned, but for some at least, that depends on how Assad himself behaves in this whole situation.
Russia for its part seems to already be pushing Damascus to open up to the political process again: its brief applications of ceasefires and bombing halts, with proposals for more extended lulls, point in that direction. Clearly, Putin wants to impress on Mr. Assad that the Syrian regime's key objective right now is political not military: namely, to secure a détente with Erdogan. Such an accord, especially if enforced on the Turkish side by an intensified crackdown on dissent against the presidency, would serve Damascus far more than retaking Aleppo. Given that both the regime and its Iranian-sponsored militia allies have reinforced the city's front lines by the thousands since their siege was punctured two weeks ago - on top of a re-intensified Russian air campaign - the present stalemate should be more than sustainable, giving a sufficient backdrop to an eventual restart of negotiations per the Geneva format.
That would be a major diplomatic coup for the Axis of Fatima: if a resumed Geneva enshrines Turkish acceptance of Assad's role in a political transition. To facilitate such an outcome, the Syrian regime has clearly increased its overtures to other major powers: both India and China have been responsive to a broader re-legitimization of the government in Damascus amongst the international community (one can smell Russian influence or even orchestration behind this, too).
As these political and diplomatic chips fall into place for the Axis of Fatima, the final wild card will be the US, Saudi, and wider Sunni Arab (especially Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC) response. They would seem to be the big losers in the event of Assad's survival and Putin's ascendancy in the Levant, but only if they fail to adapt to a new strategic reality. With both Turkey and the US no longer in the coalition to eliminate Assad, their own support for the effort is effectively neutered.
Even this, of course, doesn't rule out the unfortunate possibility that the jihadists or even revolutionaries at Aleppo may well be suicidal: so bent on revenge and destruction of the hated old order that they won't settle for even an appreciable role in shaping a new one. Sad to say, but should that come to pass, the kid gloves will have to come off.
Optimistically, all will be well in the end, if only because even the apparent losers will have no palatable alternatives. Quite bluntly, even if America's Sunni allies in the region lose faith altogether in Washington, their only alternative is the emerging Moscow-Beijing axis. And for all its authoritarianism - probably actually because of it - any Sino-Russian order would have far less interest in proxy warfare through "democratic" insurrections. Not least because the likes of Saudi Arabia have little use for Western liberalism themselves, such a switch would actually be quite natural.
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