At the moment, a brief respite in the heaviest of the Aleppo fighting could be an indication of an accord between Putin and Erdogan (who have just met to reset Russo-Turkish relations) to deescalate the Syrian crisis and gradually restart the UN-sponsored peace process.
The stalemate in Syria's second city and commercial hub could lead to a new, unprecedented legitimization of jihadists in the long-term resolution of the conflict - a development that probably wouldn't be as terrible as the West is naturally inclined to fear.
The fact is, groups like the rebranded Al Nusra Front (now called Conquest of Syria Front) have dominated the insurgency in Idlib, Latakia, and Aleppo provinces in Syria for so long that they've become political as well as military fixtures in much of the region - or perhaps more accurately, their continued battlefield prowess is directly a function of their political acumen. Somewhat reminiscent of how the Shia militant faction Hezbollah became ensconced in parts of Lebanon over the course of that country's long civil war in the 1980s, the Sunni jihadists have likewise implanted themselves in a sizeable chunk of territory in the Syrian northwest (primarily Idlib province) not merely through force of arms, but day-to-day governance and administration that has earned them the respect, in some cases even the endearment, of local communities.
Without such a substantial geographic support base, it's impossible for these militants to launch the kind of large attacks that last week broke through the Assad regime's encirclement of Aleppo.
These non-ISIS Islamic militants also offer a much-needed counterpoint to the wanton violence and destruction of their erstwhile allies against Damascus: while in many cases no less committed to Sharia rule and strict interpretations of the Quran, they've been far more measured and targeted in their application of violence. Their intolerance of Shias, Alawites, Christians, moderate Sunnis, and more generally the secularized world at large seems not to be an end in itself, as often appears to be the case with the pathological killers of Daesh: rather, it's treated as a necessary component in the strategy of consolidating power in the core areas of Salafist control in the context of an ongoing brutal war of annihilation.
In that light, Al Nusra's break with Al Qaeda two weeks ago shows the flexibility and adaptivity of the jihadists in achieving their aims. The implementation of Islamic rule in the areas it dominates is a hard "fact on the ground" that has far more real value to Syria's Islamic revolution than any generalized "solidarity" with Islamic militancy worldwide. Should the Sunni fundamentalists who have spearheaded the struggle against Assad since 2013 continue to shift gears to a hybrid military-political track, it could pave the way for a broad recognition of the Salafist role in a new, federated and multifaceted Syrian political landscape.
That could prove a harder pill to swallow for Assad and for Washington than it would be for Putin or Erdogan; but if Moscow and Ankara become the principal proponents for locking down the current stalemate in Aleppo - as the centerpiece of a broader equilibrium in Syria as a whole - it becomes far easier to see a situation in which those who can live with a partial victory would gladly settle for a partial defeat to secure it.
Either way, the jihadists would serve their own cause well to become progressively more moderate in their short-term demands and objectives; their overarching aim now should be to win seats and influence at the negotiating table, and their military activity should be aligned to that end. Every civil war's resolution ultimately boils down to a question of peacetime governance - so much so that its military aspect is really just a lagging reflection of the underlying political dilemma. If the Salafists want any degree of lasting legacy to show for their sacrifices, they would do well to recognize the implausibility of imposing Sharia beyond their favorable demographic sectors; just as, by the same token, if Mr. Assad wants to present to the world a binary choice between a secular police state and a Sunni jihadistan, he must concede that the latter will have to hold at least some credible piece of real estate.
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