Tuesday, April 12, 2016

At half-year anniversary of this blog, Syria's fate hinges on Aleppo

This blog began last October 12 and at its half-year anniversary, the Syrian conflict has changed dramatically, though not in the exact manner that just about anyone would have expected.

In a general sense, this blog accurately forecasted the success of the Russian air campaign in its central aim: to secure Assad's regime around Damascus, the Mediterranean coast, and a defensible corridor linking these most habitable core portions of Syria. Likewise, we have seen the expected further radicalization of the resistance, many of whose residual secular nationalist elements have, since the late February ceasefire, been compelled to join a peace process on terms they don't like, i.e. taking Assad's immediate ouster off the table.

Notwithstanding a recent upsurge in "moderate" rebel activity such as that of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which apparently threatens the ceasefire, there seems to be enough buy-in amongst the secular nationalist opposition to the Geneva process to give Assad a clear upper hand in negotiations, which he's now pressing with the intent of getting just enough opposition representation into a new national unity government to make it an acceptable alternative to continued armed insurrection.

That leaves Al Qaeda's local affiliate Al Nusra Front and its motley collection of jihadist allies, notably Ahrar al-Sham, as the dominant "rebel" presence still effective on the battlefield - with the FSA and other non-jihadist groups increasingly pushed to all but abandon their own residual revolutionary goals if they choose to remain in the most credible anti-regime coalition. Of course, Western media has continued to play up the possibility - already defunct all the way back in 2013 - that these "moderates" can still be a viable alternative to the Baathist state while simultaneously opposing the extremists: it just goes to show how the neocons and their minions can never bring themselves to accept failure and readjust accordingly.

In fact, whatever "moderate" forces even remain at all owe their existence exclusively to Russian and even regime goodwill and flexibility: they were given a breather since late February to enter into talks with the regime, not to restart their fantasy revolution. Now that even their provisional Islamist allies, especially Al Nusra, have turned increasingly hostile against them, it's only a matter of time - after all their showboating with the defiant banners of the old Arab Spring - that they take the only sensible path left for them, namely join those of their brethren who have already made overtures to Damascus.

That being said, it appears they're willing to give force of arms a chance in Aleppo, where they're gearing up for a final stand against the Axis of Fatima as the latter prepares an assault to recapture the city.

Thus, at this blog's half-year anniversary, Syria's fate hinges on Aleppo, both the divided and besieged city itself and the surrounding province. The Axis of Fatima's gathering offensive could in itself be a sign of confidence that the political process is gaining enough traction to further isolate Al Nusra and other implacable jihadists: another round of heavy spankings on the field should convince remaining "moderates" that their armed leverage is exclusively dependent on an unpalatable and unsustainable alignment with such extremists, who themselves are doomed to military defeat, if even by long attrition. That should bring more of them into the fold of Geneva, where the UN and even the West have all but surrendered the notion that Mr. Assad won't be a central figure in any transition to a new arrangement for the country.

Once that's achieved, the Axis of Fatima's other problems - notably ISIS and the Kurdish question (including Turkish designs) - are comparatively trivial.

As usual in war and politics, the stupid are penalized for mistaking leniency and patience for weakness and unresolve. That's what the "moderates" who have not taken advantage of the ceasefire to join peace talks, but on the contrary seized on the regime's shift of attention to ISIS (i.e. Palmyra) to improve their military position in Aleppo, are about to find out.

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